CANADIAN INSTITUTE FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

WORKING PAPER

PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE 1980S: THE VIEW OF CANADIANS

January 1988

Don Munton

INSTITUT CANADIEN POUR LA PAIX ET
LA SECURITÉ INTERNATIONALES

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PREFACE

CIIPS Working Papers are the result of research work in progress, often intended for later publication by the Institute or another publication, and are regarded by CIIPS to be of immediate value for distribution in limited numbers--mostly to specialists in the field. Unlike all other Institute publications, these papers are published in the original language only.

The opinions contained in the papers are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute and its Board of Directors.

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CONDENSÉ

Le présent Document de travail est fondé sur les résultats d'un sondage national commandé et financé par l'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales, et conçu pour ce dernier par l'auteur. Le sondage comportait 45 questions qui concernaient la perception que le public canadien a des deux superpuissances, de ce qui menace la paix et la sécurité, et des politiques qui seraient souhaitables en matière de sécurité et de limitation des armements. Le sondage s'est effectué par courrier, en anglais et en français, de juin à septembre 1987, sous la direction du Longwoods Research Group; l'échantillon comptait 1 015 Canadiens et Canadiennes.

Le sondage a révélé que le public canadien est très sceptique au sujet des politiques stratégiques et étrangères que les États-Unis et l'URSS ont suivies au cours des années 1970 et 1980. La plupart des Canadiens et Canadiennes pensent maintenant que les politiques et les armements de ces deux pays, et non pas seulement de l'URSS, sont les principales causes des tensions entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Aux yeux de la population, les arsenaux nucléaires actuels des deux superpuissances accroissent les risques de guerre, au lieu de les réduire. Ce qui est sans doute plus frappant encore, comparativement aux attitudes des années antérieures, c'est que le public canadien a plutôt mauvaise opinion des politiques et des objectifs américains, tandis qu'il tend à voir d'un oeil moins soupçonneux et moins hostile les objectifs et les politiques soviétiques.

Trois facteurs démographiques, à savoir l'âge, le sexe et la langue, influent sur l'opinion canadienne. Règle générale, les différentes générations de Canadiens et de Canadiennes perçoivent de la même façon les États-Unis, leurs intentions ou leurs politiques, mais elles accusent des différences sur

diverses questions de fond se rapportant en partie à l'utilité des forces armées. La jeunesse canadienne semble moins satisfaite des mesures militaires conventionnelles employées face aux problèmes internationaux, et elle paraît plus sceptique au sujet de la valeur ou de la stabilité du système actuel et de la viabilité de notions fondamentales telles que la dissuasion. Les hommes semblent s'inquiéter moins des menaces pesant sur la sécurité et faire davantage confiance aux deux superpuissances. Relativement aux questions de fond, les hommes adoptent systématiquement, quoique sans agressivité, une position typique des "faucons", contrairement aux femmes, qui s'identifient plutôt aux "colombes".

En ce qui concerne la paix et la sécurité, les Canadiens français semblent se cantonner sur des positions plus traditionnelles et plus radicales que celles de leurs homologues anglophones. D'une part, les francophones ont encore tendance à percevoir l'Union soviétique sous un jour rappelant l'époque de la guerre froide mais d'un autre côté, ce sont eux qui se montrent les plus critiques à l'endroit des deux superpuissances.

Ces attitudes, manifestement caractéristiques de l'après-guerre froide et de l'après-détente, joueront, semble-t-il, en permanence un rôle clef dans les débats à venir sur les questions de fond au Canada et au sein de l'Alliance occidentale.

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Introduction

Contemplating public opinion on international peace and security issues seems to give rise to an unusual number of contradictions and confusions. Perhaps it is the elusive nature of public opinion itself, perhaps the apparent chasm separating most individuals from the particular subject matter of peace and security, but what we know about what we think remains largely lost in a fog. What is not often recognized is that the contradictions and confusions exist at least as much in the minds of those who observe and comment upon public opinion as in the minds of those who comprise it.

Three criticisms about public opinion in this area tend to be made: criticisms of coherence, of coloration, and of constancy. First, there are those assumptions and arguments that dismiss as meaningless public opinion on such a rarified subject as security and arms control. The average person, it is said, has too little understanding of the technicalities of these subjects for anything but random thoughts. Only experts are sufficiently knowledgeable to be in a position to render useful, mutually consistent judgements.

In addition to a presumed lack of coherence, there are competing criticisms about coloration. Faced with a foreign threat, public opinion, it is sometimes said, tends to appeasement, perhaps even pacifism. The people, when offered a choice, will always choose peace rather than going to war. A contrary view is that people tend to be jingoistic, militaristic and bellicose. Rather than too readily choosing peace, they are too readily aroused to war.

Third, there are the criticisms about constancy. Public opinion, it is often said, is unrepentantly fickle. There may have been thousands of demonstrators in the streets yesterday, observers note, but today all quiet has been restored on the

Western front. Or, as one observer said of the recent Soviet-American treaty banning intermediate-range nuclear missiles, if you give the public an arms control agreement, it will suddenly decide it wants more.

These arguments are caricatures. But the fact is we do not know very much about what Canadians think about peace and security issues and these views are too seldom the subject of serious scrutiny. The purpose of the present paper is to try to throw some light on this unclear subject. It reports the complete results of a recent public opinion survey in Canada on international peace and security issues. In the process of exploring these results, some doubt will also be thrown on many of the above misconceptions about public opinion.

The Survey

The survey was commissioned and funded by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security and designed for CIIPS by the present author. The first of two planned phases--a set of 45 questions--was conducted in June through September, 1987 by the Longwoods Research Group with a national sample selected randomly to be representative of Canadian households and chosen from a panel of 30,000 households maintained by Market Facts Ltd. The survey was conducted by mail in both English and French and comprised a total of 1015 respondents. The response rate to the survey was 48%. The margin of error with a sample of this size is approximately +/- 4%, 95 times out of 100. The second phase is planned for the summer of 1988.

This is not the first national public opinion survey in Canada to explore attitudes on international peace and security issues. The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion

(CIPO), the Canadian Gallup Poll, has for decades asked international peace and security-oriented questions on its regular omnibus polls. Moreover, it has consistently made its data available to researchers. Generally speaking, however, the number of peace and security questions on the most useful of these surveys has still been rather low, numbering in the handful at best. The 'tracks,' therefore, while extending historically over a lengthy period of time, are often irregular and frequently simply die out.

The first major survey in Canada on international peace and security issues was sponsored by the then newly-founded Canadian Peace Research Institute (CPRI) in 1962. It dealt with many issues and attitudes that are still relevant and timely today--perceptions of threat, particularly from the Soviet Union, support for policies vis-a-vis the USSR, support for a nuclear testing ban and other arms control and disarmament matters, and so on. Nothing quite as extensive was carried out in Canada for many years.

Recently there has been significantly more surveying of Canadians' attitudes in this specific area and on international issues broadly. The Department of External Affairs, for example, has sponsored general international affairs surveys in 1979, 1984, 1985 and 1987. Given the broad focus of these, however, the international peace and security questions have been limited in number. (The Department, on behalf of the Government, has also, for example, done extensive and regular polling specifically on attitudes toward free trade during 1986-7.) The United States Information Agency has as well conducted regular polls in Canada during the late 1970s and 1980s--more often, in fact, than has the Department of External Affairs. Interestingly enough the focus of these is almost entirely economic in nature. Unlike the attitudes of Europeans on international peace and security

matters, in which the USIA has maintained a keen interest, especially through the early 1980s, the attitudes of Canadians on these issues apparently evokes rather little interest in Washington.

Other than the 1962 CPRI study, the only other survey of substantial scope on peace and security attitudes of Canadians currently available for analysis was one conducted for the CBC just prior to the 1985 Geneva summit meeting. It covered a broad range of issues, including perceptions of the superpowers and their leaders, concerns about East-West relations, prospects for the summit itself, American and Soviet foreign policies in other regions, and Canadian policies on a number of matters.

While the CIIPS survey hardly stands alone it is the most extensive national survey conducted on attitudes to the superpowers, peace and security in terms of the range of questions it comprises. Neither the 1962 CPRI nor the 1985 CBC survey provide as many questions specifically on East-West aspects of international peace and security.

Purpose and Format

The purpose of this working paper is not to generalize about Canadian public opinion in all its multifaceted character, nor to summarize the results of all these surveys. Rather, the purpose is to summarize and reflect on those aspects of Canadian opinion evident in a particular survey. The format is as follows:

The paper examines first the perceptions of threat to Canadian security held by Canadians. It then looks closely at the perceptions held of the two superpowers--and observes a striking, indeed fundamental shift in Canadians' views,

particularly of the United States, from that which existed twenty-five years ago. It then looks specifically at perceptions of the possibility of nuclear war--and, again, finds some striking evidence of a change in the way Canadians view the United States as well as the spectre of a nuclear catastrophe.

The paper then turns to the international policies Canadians favour, and in some cases advocate, to deal with the perceived threats to their security and the danger of war. These include the idea of a comprehensive test ban, the first use of nuclear weapons in Europe, and, in particular, proposals concerning substantial reductions in nuclear weaponry. It looks as well at attitudes on a number of policy issues of particular interest to Canadians, such as Canadian defence commitments and whether or not Canada ought to be declared a nuclear weapon-free zone.

Finally, some major differences in attitudes amongst groups of Canadians will be summarized. These differences are particularly strong and consistent with respect to age, gender, language and region.

Perceptions of Threat

Respondents to the survey were asked what posed the greatest threat to world peace. Very few pointed to the USSR. Only one in every twenty (5%) said Soviet actions on the international scene were the greatest threat. About the same number (8%) thought it to be American actions. On the other hand, fully one-quarter believed the superpower arms race was the greatest threat. Finally, approximately equal groups thought that the spread of nuclear weapons to smaller countries and the Middle East situation were the greatest threat (29% and 27%, respectively).

These results closely parallel those from an almost identical question asked on the CBC poll prior to the Geneva summit in November 1985. At that time, slightly more-- about 10%--believed Soviet actions were the greatest threat. Approximately the same proportion (9%) regarded American actions as the greatest threat. Slightly fewer pointed to the arms race, but, as in the above, the differences (27% in 1987 versus 22% in 1985) are not statistically significant. The proportion pointing to the spread of nuclear arms to smaller countries was virtually the same in both surveys (29% in 1987, 27% in 1985) as was the proportion concerned about the Middle East (27% in 1987, 24% in 1985).

Both these sets of findings, it might also be noted, suggest strongly that most Canadians disagree with the assumption of the Canadian Government's 1987 White Paper on Defence that "the principal direct threat to Canada continues to be a nuclear attack on North America by the Soviet Union." Few Canadians apparently regard a Soviet nuclear attack as likely. The greatest threat, most seem to be saying, lies in an unstable relationship between the superpowers and in the possible escalation of a regional conflict.

The CIIPS survey results are further borne out by a survey done at about the same time for the Department of External Affairs. Asked which of a list of possible causes was most responsible for tensions between East and West, a near majority of the DEA survey respondents chose "a lack of trust" between East and West. Once again, only a small minority pointed to Soviet policies.

Canadians currently are as likely to blame the US as the USSR for recent tensions and to view certain American policies as negatively as Soviet policies. In the External Affairs

survey, while about one in every seven or eight (13%) indicated East-West tensions had arisen from Soviet attempts to increase their power and influence, a similar proportion (13%) thought tensions were caused by American attempts to increase their power and influence.

Respondents to the CIIPS survey were asked how concerned they were about the state of Soviet-American relations during the past two to three years and whether these relations had improved, remained about the same, or deteriorated. Most (54%) were somewhat concerned, but about one in five (19%) replied they were very concerned. Just over one in every four (27%) were either not very concerned or not at all concerned. Most (52%) also thought Soviet-American relations had remained about the same during the past two or three years. More believed they had improved (35%) than saw deterioration (14%).

A follow-up question was aimed at determining which of the superpowers, if either, was responsible for the improvement or deterioration. Of those who saw an improvement in these relations in recent years, many more regarded the USSR as responsible for this improvement than thought the US responsible (40% to 10%). The rest (50%) regarded both countries as responsible for the improvement. Of those who saw a deterioration in relations, at least up to mid-1987, more blamed the United States than the USSR (28% versus 7%). Most of the group which saw deterioration, like the group which perceived an improvement, blamed both superpowers.

Beyond recent and current developments, what do Canadians see as the long-term prospects in East-West relations? Posed with the question "Do you think the Western countries can continue to live peacefully with the Soviets, or do you think there is bound to be a major war sooner or later with the

Soviets?" almost one in four (39%) were undecided. Of the those who did have a view, the pattern was more optimistic than pessimistic. More thought that the West could live peacefully with the Soviets (45%) than expected there would be war sooner or later (15%).

Perceptions of the Superpowers

With respect to the perceptions we have of the actors in international politics it is conventional to distinguish between their capabilities, on the one hand, and their motivations or intentions, on the other. Thus the CIIPS survey asked Canadians whether they thought that the Soviet Union and its allies are "superior, inferior, or roughly equal to the military strength of the United States and its allies?" A strong majority (62%) believe them to be roughly equal, a judgement shared by a substantial number of experts in this area. A strong minority (31%) regard the Soviets as superior and only a small proportion (7%) regard them as inferior.

On the element of motivations or intentions, Canadians seem to be rather wary, at best, of the basic thrust of both superpowers' policies. Eight out of ten (79%) believe the USSR is trying to increase its influence in the world today. But eight out of ten (81%) also believe the US is trying to increase its influence. Few, only 20%, believe either power is more or less content with its present influence. (See Figure 1.)

Confidence in the ability of each superpower to deal wisely with present world problems is also low. Once again, Canadians' skepticism is clear and the same parallelism emerged almost as strongly. Less than four out of every ten Canadians (38%) expressed very great or considerable confidence in the ability of the United States. Over six in ten

FIG. 1. Perceptions of Superpower Policies re Influence, 1987



FIG. 2. Confidence in Superpower Policies, 1987



expressed little, very little or no confidence (62%). On the other hand, and even more surprisingly, almost three in ten (28%) expressed very great or considerable confidence in the Soviet Union's ability to deal wisely with the world's problems--only slightly fewer than in the case of the US. The rest, seven in ten, expressed little, very little or no confidence.

In short, overall confidence in American policy was not much higher than that in Soviet policy. (See Figure 2.) Although historical public opinion data are thin it seems that forty years of cold peace with the USSR, including a decade of detente, as well as a few years of Mikhail Gorbachev's appealing diplomacy, have persuaded Canadians that Soviet handling of world problems is not all bad. Conversely, a few decades of US foreign policy problems, including Vietnam and Nicaragua, topped by a term or two of Ronald Reagan's simplistic and sometimes bellicose rhetoric, have persuaded Canadians that American handling of world problems is not all good.

Identical questions were also asked in the CIIPS survey regarding how trustworthy Reagan and Gorbachev were on nuclear and arms control issues and regarding whether or not the American and Soviet leaders genuinely wanted disarmament. Few regarded either Reagan or Gorbachev as very trustworthy. About half perceived each of the two leaders "somewhat" trustworthy, though slightly more thus evaluated Gorbachev than similarly evaluated Reagan (55% versus 47%). The two leaders were regarded as "not very" trustworthy on these issues by the same proportion, roughly one-third (34%). Gorbachev was seen as "not at all" trustworthy by one in ten (9%). Reagan was similarly categorized by slightly more (14%). (See Figure 3.)

FIG. 3. Perceptions of Reagan and Gorbachev: Trustworthiness, 1987



FIG. 4. Perceptions of Superpower Policies re Disarmament, 1987



The same skepticism about superpower policies is evident in perceptions of the respective leaderships' interest in disarmament, as is Canadians' relatively negative view of the United States. The exact wording of the questions was: "Some people believe that the Soviet (or American) leaders do not genuinely want disarmament. Other people believe that they do genuinely want disarmament. Which of these views is closest to your own?" A majority of respondents perceived each leadership as not wanting disarmament, though more thus perceived American leaders (63%) than so perceived Soviet leaders (54%). Fewer regarded the American leadership as genuinely interested in disarmament than regarded the Soviets as such (37% to 46%). (See Figure 4.)

The extent to which Canadians' views on these matters have shifted over the long-term is most evident in a comparison between these 1987 results and those from an identical pair of questions on the 1962 Canadian Peace Research Institute (CPRI) survey. In 1962, the vast majority of Canadians believed that the Soviet leaders did not want disarmament and that American leaders did. Now, as noted above, Canadians are almost evenly divided on whether the Soviets do or do not want disarmament and most believe the Americans do not want it. (See Figures 5 and 6.)

A similar picture emerges from another comparison of questions adapted from the 1962 CPRI study. The focus was perceived responsibility for the lack of progress in disarmament talks. The 1987 version of the first question was: "Until recently there has been little progress in the disarmament talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Which country do you think has been holding up these discussions?" (The 1962 version was: "Disarmament talks have been going on between Russia and the West for many years now without success. Who do you think has been holding them up?")

FIG. 5. Soviet Leaders and Disarmament
1962 and 1987



FIG. 6. American Leaders and Disarmament
1962 and 1987



The vast majority of 1987 respondents (75%) said both countries. The rest were divided more or less evenly between blaming the United States (14%) and blaming the Soviet Union (11%). In contrast, in 1962, Canadians were as likely to blame the Soviet Union (43%) as both (47%). The follow-up question, addressed to those who had blamed both countries, probed to see if one or the other was more to blame. Most maintained that the blame was to be shared close-up equally. Of those who opted to blame either power, as many gave responsibility to the United States as to the Soviet Union.

During the cold war period most Canadians had essentially positive perceptions about the US and essentially negative perceptions of the USSR. It is no longer so. Perhaps most striking of all in the 1987 survey is an evident tendency on the part of many individual Canadians to be negative about both superpower's policies.

Fully one in three (32%) find neither leader trustworthy on arms control. In contrast, 11% regarded Ronald Reagan as trustworthy and Gorbachev as not trustworthy; that is, only one in ten Canadians seem to have the traditional cold war set of perceptions. More, in fact, have the opposite view; 17% regard Reagan as not trustworthy and Gorbachev as trustworthy. The rest, around 40%, find both at least somewhat trustworthy on arms control. (See Figure 7.)

This 'plague on both your policies' sentiment emerges even more prominently on the other parallel questions. Almost a majority of those surveyed (46%) believed neither superpower leadership was genuinely interested in disarmament. (See Figure 8, where wanting disarmament is shown as a "+" and not wanting it is shown as a "-".) Nearly six in ten (57%) expressed little or no confidence in both the American and the

FIG. 7. Trustworthiness of Both Superpowers



FIG. 8. Interest of Both Superpowers in Disarmament



Soviet ability to handle world problems. (See Figure 9, where some confidence is shown as a "+" and little or no confidence is shown as a "-".) Finally, almost seven in ten (68%) believed both the US and USSR are trying to increase their areas of influence. (See Figure 10, where the perception that the superpowers are content with their influence is shown as a "+" and that they are trying to increase their influence is shown as a "-".)

Perceptions of the Possibility of Nuclear War

It is a truism to say that the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe has hung over the entire postwar period. And of this constant and dominating fact of the present age, the publics in most countries are well aware. That is not to say, however, that publics' perception of the danger of a nuclear war have also been constant. They have not. Rather, the perceived danger seems to have risen and fallen with the atmosphere or tenor of East-West relations.

The respondents to the CIIPS survey were asked, simply, whether there is much danger of nuclear war or not much danger. Slightly more believed there was much danger (55%) than not much danger (46%). (See Figure 11.) This particular question has not often been asked in Canada but when it was included in a Canadian Gallup poll in late 1961, at one of the heights of the Cold War, the result was also a split, but with the majority perhaps leaning the other way. At that time, 46% said there was much danger and 54% said there was not much.

A follow-up question on the CIIPS survey was worded as follows: "Whether you believe there is much danger or there is not much danger, are the chances of nuclear war breaking out greater, less, or the same as they were ten years ago?" More believed the chances were greater (44%) than the same

FIG. 9. Confidence in Both Superpowers



FIG. 10. Increasing Influence in Both Superpowers` Policies



(31%) or less (25%). (See Figure 12.) Not surprisingly, those who said there was much danger also tended to say that the chances were greater than ten years ago and those who said there was not much danger tended to say the chances were less. This second question has appeared repeatedly on Gallup surveys through the 1970s and 1980s. The trend of the responses is shown in Figure 15. (The difference each year between the total responses and 100% is made up by non-responses or "don't knows.")

When first asked in 1971, at a time when East-West detente was very much in evidence, most Canadians regarded the chances of nuclear war as less great than ten years previous. This proportion rather quickly declined in the ensuing years and the proportion who saw the chances as greater increased dramatically. The latter group doubled in size between 1971 and 1975, and then doubled again between 1975 and 1979. It then apparently increased much more slowly through the early 1980s.

The 1987 CIIPS results thus suggest that Canadians' concerns about the possibility of a nuclear war have declined in the mid- to late-80s. This trend may be a reflection of a perceived improvement in East-West relations. But it is probably also a consequence of the particular nature of the question which calls for a comparison with a decade earlier. Assuming at least some respondents have a general appreciation of the fluctuating state of East-West relations, the responses to the question are also being affected by the changing reference point. That is to say, the reference point in 1982 was 1972, the year of SALT I, while that for 1987 was, of course, 1977, a year of increasing Soviet-American problems. Thus it makes sense that the more troubled the reference point, as well as the less troubled the current period, the less pessimistic would be the current outlook.

FIGURE 11
Danger of Nuclear War



FIGURE 12
Chance of War Compared to Decade Ago



FIGURE 13
Cause of Nuclear War



FIGURE 14
Responsibility for War



FIGURE 15
Chances of War Compared with Ten Years Ago



The survey also asked two questions concerning the causes of a possible nuclear war. The first was: "Which do you think is a more likely cause of a nuclear war, a nuclear attack triggered by accident or a deliberate attack?" A slight majority (57%) thought an attack triggered by accident was the more likely. Fewer (43%) thought a deliberate attack more likely. (See Figure 13.) The second question asked the respondents to consider specifically which country or countries might be responsible: "Whichever you believe is more likely--an accidental or deliberate attack--who is most likely to be responsible for it?" Forty percent thought that both superpowers would be responsible. The same proportion thought that some other country would be the cause. Only 11% thought that the Soviet Union would be responsible and almost as many (9%) said the United States. (See Figure 14.)

Policy Preferences

How then to preserve the peace? Asked about the measures that would best do so Canadians rejected increased weaponry and supported reductions of nuclear weapons. The CIIPS survey posed the following alternative statements: "Some people think that the best way to prevent war is for the West to increase its military strength so as to be more powerful than the Soviets. Others think that this would speed up the arms race and may lead to war." They were then asked: "What do you think? Should the West try to increase its military strength or not?" By more than a two to one margin (71% to 29%) Canadians said the West should not increase its military strength.

This prescription represents a substantial shift in attitude from the early 1960s. Exactly the same question was asked in the 1962 national survey conducted by the Canadian

Peace Research Institute. At that time, almost six out of ten Canadians (58%) believed the best way to prevent war would be for the West to increase its military strength and gain superiority. Only about one in three (32%) thought the West should not increase its military capability. Twenty-five years later, this pattern is now reversed.

To pursue this point, the CIIPS respondents were also asked in the 1987 survey whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement that "the security of Western countries could best be increased by substantial reductions in both American and Soviet nuclear weapons" [emphasis added here]. Fully 80% agreed or strongly agreed. Almost all the rest disagreed rather than strongly disagreed. To put this point succinctly, Canadians no longer believe in a basic maxim of international politics--that more weapons make us more secure--at least with respect to nuclear weapons. The new belief, evident for the first time in this survey, is that Canadians in general now believe that they would be more secure with fewer nuclear weapons.

The spring 1987 External Affairs survey posed two related questions--whether the "existence" of nuclear weapons and whether current nuclear practices and developments make war less likely or more likely. A clear majority said both make war more likely (54% and 59%, respectively). Distinct minorities thought these factors made war less likely (33% and 28%, respectively). (The pattern of responses to the second of these questions, that concerning nuclear "practices and developments," would likely be different following the December INF agreement.)

Although the CIIPS survey posed questions on a number of other policy issues, it might be useful to pause at this point and try to explain this significant shift in attitudes. Why

would Canadians now believe so strongly in the need for actual disarmament? There is probably a related set of reasons at least some of which can be gleaned from other results in the survey.

There is, in part, a substantial consensus simply that a continued nuclear arms race makes a nuclear war virtually inevitable. Almost three in four (72%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that "If both sides continue to build more nuclear weapons sooner or later there will be a nuclear war." Only 28% disagreed to any extent. And, if there were any doubt about the consequences Canadians expect from a nuclear war, they can be laid to rest. In one of the strongest displays of consensus in the entire survey, 96% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the view that "There can be no winners in a global nuclear war." More than 80% strongly agreed.

There is also evident in the data a strong belief in the essential principle of nuclear deterrence. No fewer than 86% agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that "Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is likely to launch a nuclear attack because both know the other would retaliate." Combine this belief with the majority view, noted earlier, that a nuclear war is more likely to come about by accident rather than by design, and it is clearer why support for "substantial reductions" is as strong as it is. If both sides are at present deterred from any attack, if a continued build-up will increase the chances of a war, and the more likely scenario is an accidental nuclear war, Canadians seem to be saying, arms reductions are in order.

Further insights here can be gained from the responses to the following, apparently similar question to that on deterrence: "The only way we can prevent a nuclear war is by

making sure that both the Soviets and Americans have enough weapons to discourage the other from attacking." Roughly speaking, one-third strongly disagreed and one-third disagreed. Slightly less than one in five agreed and about the same number strongly agreed.

At first these results might seem rather contradictory, given the strong majority, noted earlier, supporting the notion that neither side is likely to attack for fear of retaliation and, here, a majority against this similar proposition. What makes this latter question different, however, are two crucial elements. One is the phrase "enough weapons," which may for some respondents carry the implication that more weapons would be more of a discouragement--a notion that most reject. More important, perhaps, is the phrase "the only way." This phrase clearly implies that arms control and disarmament have no role to play in preventing war--a view that most Canadians also reject. It is thus not illogical at all that a majority would believe in the basic principle of deterrence but reject this only superficially similar proposition. In short, there is no contradiction.

There is little support amongst Canadians for what might be termed hardline views of how to deal with the Soviets. Thus, for example, almost nine out of every ten (86%) disagree or strongly disagree with the statement that "The West should take all steps to defeat Communism even if it means risking nuclear war." (By way of contrast, only 47% disagreed with this same statement in the 1962 CPRI study.)

Moreover, almost eight out of ten (79%) disagreed with the view that "We cannot trust the Soviets, so we shouldn't try to negotiate arms control with them." And over six in ten (63%) disagreed with the notion that "The Soviets always seem

to be the winners in any negotiated arms agreement with Western countries."

Support for substantial disarmament amongst the Canadian public ought not to be misconstrued. It does not mean that the public would be happier to get rid of all nuclear weapons in any way as soon as possible. There is some evidence in the 1987 survey, in fact, that not only hardline policies are rejected but also quasi-pacifist ones. Thus, there is only modest support for unilateral Western disarmament, even when such an initiative is limited in scope. A bare 4% strongly agree with the statement that "The West should start to disarm even if the Soviet Union does not." Less than one-quarter (21%) agree. Three-quarters (75%) disagree or strongly disagree. There is also evidence, presented later, that support for nuclear disarmament does not undermine support for conventional forces.

One of the most prominent of current arms control and disarmament proposals if we consider the agenda beyond simple reductions of weaponry--and one which has been supported for by Canadian governments and spokesmen, from Howard Green in the 1960s to the present--is that of a comprehensive test ban (or CTB). Presumably partly as a result of this pressure, and of course, as partly a result of Canada's lack of nuclear weapons, Canadians strongly support the idea of a CTB. This is the case here despite a question wording designed to provide some of the argument for both sides.

The exact wording was: "There has been a great deal of debate on the need for a complete ban on the testing of all nuclear weapons both in the air and underground. Some people say that the maintenance of a strong deterrence force can be guaranteed only by regular testing of existing and experimental future nuclear weapons. Which one opinion is closest

to your own?" Fully eight out of ten (81%) want a total ban on nuclear weapons testing. Less than two in ten (19%) oppose it.

An important aspect of the general problem of arms control and disarmament seldom touched on in public opinion polls is that of verification of agreements. Though pollsters may have been slow to explore public attitudes on this complex and often technical subject, it is difficult to argue that public attitudes are of no or little consequence here. Verification is crucial surely not just for the officials who negotiate or sign arms control agreements but also for the support these agreements will obtain and maintain from the public. Whether or not assurance of compliance by the other side is provided by an agreement thus probably also has some role, and perhaps a very important role, in public support for arms control.

The CIIPS survey asked again a question first (and, apparently, last) posed on the 1962 CPRI study. It was: "Still thinking about the disarmament negotiations...which of the following statements is closer to your point of view?...We should not agree to any substantial disarmament unless inspection of nuclear facilities in all countries is so careful that there is little risk of cheating. Or,...No inspection system is perfect. We should be willing to accept some risks to get a disarmament agreement?" The results of the 1987 survey suggest Canadians attitudes on inspection have changed moderately but significantly. In short, fewer demand no risk and substantially more are willing to accept some risks of cheating in order to achieve disarmament. A very bare majority (51%) in the recent survey, compared to two-thirds (65%) in 1962, believe that disarmament must await inspection "so careful that there is little risk of cheating." Almost as many in 1987 preferred the second statement as the

first. Nearly one in every two (46%) agreed that "no inspection system is perfect" and that some risks were an acceptable cost of achieving a disarmament agreement.

Canadian Policies

The CIIPS survey also dealt with some particularly Canadian policy issues:

One of the recurring debates of Canadian foreign policy concerns the influence that Canada does or can have in international affairs. Though what Canadians themselves think about this matter is seldom part of the debate itself, their expectations appear to be modest. Asked "In general terms, how much influence do you think Canada, as a nation, has on the course of world events?", only a very small minority (4%) suggested Canada had a great deal of influence. About three in every ten thought it had some influence. A majority, about five in ten (52%), described it as very little. Finally, about one in ten saw Canada exerting no influence at all.

Another of these recurring Canadian foreign policy debates concerns the extent to which Canada plays or can play the role of a middle power "mediator" in international conflicts. While the term itself is often used ambiguously, it can be taken to imply, or to presuppose, a degree of neutrality in world politics. There can be little doubt that Canadians find attractive the notion that their country has a role to play helping to settle the conflicts of others; the popular appeal of Lester Pearson's Suez diplomacy in 1956, of Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping efforts, and of Pierre Trudeau's "Peace Initiative" all attest to this element of the Canadian self-image.

It is perhaps another matter whether Canadians think of their country as in any sense 'neutral.' The question posed to explore this point was whether one would agree or disagree with the following statement: "Even though Canada is a member of NATO, I tend to think of Canada as being neutral between the two superpowers." In short, the public is divided, with a slight majority in agreement. Though 44% disagree or strongly disagree, 56% agree or strongly agree. What impact this self-perception might have on preferred Canadian policies is a complex and little-explored question. It seems likely, nevertheless, that it is of some influence.

One possible manifestation of this influence may be on attitudes to one of the ideas of growing interest to anti-nuclear groups in Canada--that of declaring the country a nuclear weapon-free zone. Although proposals of this sort have been made in various forms by various groups and individuals it has not yet sparked a major national policy debate, and it has certainly not become the issue in Canada that it has in New Zealand, for example. It would be wrong to conclude from this assessment, however, that Canadians do not have preferences when the issue is presented to them.

Given that most Canadians have opposed a nuclear weapons role for Canada since the late 1960s, the nature of the nuclear weapon-free zone idea is likely to be at least superficially attractive to many. For this reason the question developed for the CIIPS survey was carefully balanced to suggest the negative implications of such a Canadian decision on its alliance relationships. It was: "Some people have suggested that Canada should become a nuclear weapon-free zone, that is, that it should not allow any nuclear weapons on or over its territory. Others say that such a policy would weaken the Western alliance and cause serious problems with

Canada's allies, especially the United States. Which position do you most agree with?"

The wording of the question notwithstanding, a clear majority, almost six in every ten (57%), supported the idea of Canada becoming a nuclear weapon-free zone. Most of the rest, slightly more than four in ten (43%), opposed it. The idea may thus have a more fertile ground in Canadian public opinion and more of a future as a policy issue than has yet been recognized.

Another issue relatively long on the agenda--since early 1982 -- is that of cruise missile testing. Here, of course, the debate has been extensive and the survey evidence on how Canadians think about the issue is extensive. Essentially, and taking into account the error margins involved in all polling, the consistent pattern has been a public more or less evenly divided pro and con. To add a new element into thinking on 'the cruise,' the question asked in the CIIPS survey was as follows: "The Reagan Administration recently decided to exceed the limits for nuclear weapons as set out in the SALT II agreement. Given that Ottawa has allowed testing of cruise missiles in Canada on the understanding that the United States would continue to pursue arms reductions with the Soviet Union, should the Canadian government now refuse permission for further such tests or not?" A solid majority of 68% said Canada ought to refuse to allow more testing.

One criticism made of those who support nuclear disarmament is that they are, in fact, pacifists, that they do not believe in any need to defend themselves with weapons. There is a strong fear amongst some traditional strategic analysts that such thinking is, or could become, the norm amongst publics in a period of disarmament. The public opinion data being considered here do not allow any conclusions to be drawn

about Western publics in general, but they do allow some conclusions concerning the scope of this purported pacifist sentiment in Canada, and some conclusions about the notion that, like a sort of plague, opposition to nuclear weapons promotes an aversion to military forces in general.

Canadians' enthusiasm for nuclear arms control is not, in fact, an antipathy toward armed defence in general. Nor does it simply or even necessarily spill over into the conventional area. Indeed, despite what some might expect from the attitudes discussed above, Canadians support a maintained or stronger conventional defence effort. Asked simply whether Canadian defence forces ought to be larger, about the present size, or smaller, a strong majority, almost two-thirds (63%), want them to be "larger." One-third prefer them to be maintained at their present size. Only a small minority (5%) support reductions in Canadian forces.

The relationship between individuals' views on nuclear arms reductions and their views on Canadian defence forces is interesting. Overall, the two are related. Those who believe that Western security would not be enhanced through nuclear arms reductions tend also to support larger Canadian defence forces. Similarly, those few who support conventional reductions tend to favour nuclear arms reductions as well. The largest group of Canadians, however, do not have either of these sets of positions. A majority (50%) both agrees with the idea that nuclear arms reductions will enhance security and supports larger Canadian defence forces. This group is perhaps best described as pro-defence nuclear disarmers. A smaller group, but still the next largest at more than one in every four (27%), agrees with the idea that nuclear arms reductions will enhance security and also prefers to maintain Canadian defence forces at about their present size. If not

necessarily pro-defence, this group is certainly not opposed in principle to conventional national defence.

Further evidence against the assumption that opposition to nuclear weapons stems from a pacifist position comes from the responses to a further question about the commitment of Canadian forces to Europe. About five in every ten Canadians (49%) favour the status quo. Although few probably know the actual figures involved, they suggest that the present size of these forces is about right. More than two in ten (23%) believe these forces ought to be increased. Thus, in total, an overwhelming majority support a maintained or increased commitment in Europe.

One in ten respondents, on the other hand, favoured reducing Canadian forces. And just less than two in ten think all Canadian military forces in Europe should be withdrawn. These numbers are not insignificant, but ought to be seen in the context of other attitudes. Given the predominant view that Canadian defence forces ought to be at least maintained, it would seem to be the case that a part of the opposition to Canadian forces abroad is an opposition to sending Canadian troops abroad, and perhaps particularly to Europe, rather than an opposition to having troops at all. The opposition, in other words, is isolationist in nature rather than pacifist.

Moreover, the same broad pattern emerges in the mix of attitudes as noted above in the case of support for Canadian defence forces in general. While there are a few who want troop levels in Europe reduced or withdrawn who also believe nuclear arms reductions will improve security (about 25% of the entire sample), and a few who want then increased or kept the same who also do not believe nuclear arms reductions will improve security (about 15% in all), the bulk of Canadians (57%) simultaneously support a maintained or increased

European commitment and also believe that Western security would be enhanced by substantial nuclear arms reductions.

With a mix of attitudes on security and Canadian policies of the sort described here it is perhaps not surprising that the respondents divide more or less evenly in agreeing or disagreeing with a statement like the following: "To preserve peace in Europe, Canada should press for a strengthened NATO rather than always calling for arms reductions." Half agree or strongly agree; half disagree or strongly disagree.

There is, perhaps understandably, more approval of the idea that Europeans ought to do more for their own defence than there is approval of the idea that Canadians ought to do less. Among the statements with which the respondents were asked to agree or disagree was the view that "It's time Western Europe took more responsibility for its own defence; Canada and the United States should press them to do so." Twenty-five percent strongly agree, while 40% agree. Those who disagree or strongly disagree numbered only 35%.

Personal Characteristics

Another set of insights into Canadian public opinion on peace and security can be gained from looking at the extent to which the characteristics of respondents are related to their attitudes. The demographic factors which on inspection proved to be the most important in terms of revealing differences within the Canadian population were four: (i) age, (ii) gender, (iii) language, and (iv) region. These are discussed sequentially.

(i) Age

Concerns about the attitudes and loyalties of the young are endemic perhaps to most political systems. Certainly the commitment of Western youth to the principles of the Atlantic Alliance has been the focus of some attention and debate in recent years. The standard argument is that of the 'successor generation' problem--a new generation that has grown up in, and become accustomed to, the relative security the post World War Two period, has less awareness than their parents who lived through the last war of the need to maintain military vigilance. NATO's political problem, in other words, is that it has successfully deterred the Soviets and maintained the peace, thus making itself appear unnecessary to this new generation.

The successor generation problem seems plausible enough; what is uncertain, though, is whether there is much evidence to support its assumptions about attitude differences between generations. Do the young have less negative views of the Soviet Union? Are they less supportive of maintaining military forces?

The age grouping used here are (i) under 35 years old, (ii) 35 to 54 years old, and (iii) over 55 years old. The major differences between these age groups can be summarized briefly. (See Appendix C, Tables 1A to 1D)

Younger Canadians tend more to view the arms race as the greatest threat to world peace, as distinct from the actions of either major protagonist, and to expect war sooner or later with the USSR. Older Canadians tend more to focus on regional conflicts in the world and to expect that Western countries can live peacefully with the Soviets. Those under 35 years of age, in particular, tend more to be concerned about the danger

of nuclear war and to see its chances as greater than a decade ago. They are less concerned about the state of East-West relations than those of middle age or older but more of the view that these relations have deteriorated in recent years.

Generally speaking, the different generations in Canada do not hold different perceptions of the United States or Soviet Union, their intentions or policies, though older Canadians tended more to agree with the views that the West could not trust the Soviets and that they are usually the winners in arms control agreements. There are differences between age groups on policy issues. These could not accurately be described as being pro- versus anti-military, but are, in part, related to the usefulness of military force.

Canadians under 35 years old tend more to believe that the West should not increase its military strength so as to be more powerful than the Soviets and that a continued arms buildup will lead to war. They are more apt to be skeptical of the view that the fear of retaliation will prevent nuclear attacks and that both sides having enough weapons is the "only" way to prevent war, to strongly agree that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and to disagree with the view that the West should take all steps to defeat communism. Younger Canadians tend more to disagree that a military balance in Europe is needed and to oppose the use of nuclear weapons in the case of an overwhelming Soviet conventional attack.

Older Canadians, on the other hand, tend more to believe that the West should in the interests of peace increase its military strength so as to be more powerful than the Soviets, that a continued arms buildup will not lead to war, that the fear of retaliation will prevent nuclear attacks, and that both sides having enough weapons is the only way to prevent war. They are less likely to strongly agree that there can be

no winners in a nuclear war and more likely to agree that the West should take all steps to defeat communism. Older Canadians tend more than their younger counterparts to agree that a military balance in Europe is needed and to be willing to use nuclear weapons in the case of an overwhelming Soviet conventional attack.

In contrast to the notion of the successor generation argument, younger Canadians are in fact more in favour of maintaining or strengthening Canada's forces in Western Europe than the oldest generation. At the same time, they tend more to disagree with the view that Canada ought to call for a strengthened NATO, rather than for arms control, are more opposed to continued testing of the cruise missile, and more supportive of Canada becoming a nuclear weapon-free zone.

In short, younger Canadians seem less satisfied with conventional military measures to deal with international problems and more skeptical about both the adequacy or stability of the present system and the viability of such basic notions as deterrence.

(ii) Gender

Gender is a consistently discriminating factor in attitudes on international peace and security issues. Significant differences between the attitudes of men and women emerge across the range of questions included in the survey. (These differences are shown in percentage terms in Appendix C, Tables 2A to 2D.)

Men tend to be less concerned about East-West relations and more positive about their recent trend, more confident about both the Soviet Union's and United States' ability to deal with world problems, more trusting of both Gorbachev and

Reagan, and more optimistic there will be East-West peace in the long-term. Men also tend more to view the United States as content with its influence, as desiring disarmament, and as inferior to the Soviet Union in military strength. Partly in consequence, they are more likely to regard non-superpower developments as the greatest threats to world peace, to perceive nuclear war as not much of a danger, and to see it as less likely than it was a decade ago.

Women, on the other hand, tend to be more concerned about East-West relations and more negative about their recent state, less confident about both the Soviet Union's and United States' ability to deal with world problems, less trusting of both Gorbachev and Reagan, and pessimistic about avoiding an East-West war in the long-term. Women also tend to view the United States as trying to increase its influence, as not genuinely desiring disarmament, and as roughly equal to the Soviet Union in military strength. And perhaps partly in consequence, they are more likely to regard the arms race as the greatest threat to world peace, to perceive nuclear war as a danger, and to see it as more likely than it was a decade ago.

On policy matters, men take a consistently, albeit mildly, more 'hawkish' position. They tend more to believe that the West should increase its military strength, that the military balance in Europe needs to be maintained in order to prevent aggression, that a continued arms buildup will not lead to a nuclear war, that neither side will launch a nuclear attack for fear of retaliation, and that the only way to prevent war is to ensure both superpowers have enough weapons to discourage the other side from attacking. Furthermore, men tend more to reject the notion that security would be enhanced by nuclear arms reductions, to support continued nuclear testing, and to reject the idea that the West ought to begin

the process of disarmament even if the Soviet Union does not. Finally, they are more likely to advocate the use of nuclear weapons if Soviet forces were to launch an overwhelming attack against Western Europe.

On these same policy matters, women take as consistently a more 'dovish' position. They tend more to believe that the West should not increase its military strength, that the military balance in Europe does not need to be maintained in order to prevent aggression, and that a continued arms buildup will lead to a nuclear war. They tend to be skeptical that the fear of retaliation will necessarily deter nuclear attack and that the only way to prevent war is to ensure both superpowers have enough weapons to discourage the other side from attacking. Women tend more to accept the notion that security would be enhanced by nuclear arms reductions, to support a ban on nuclear testing, and to support the idea that the West ought to begin the process of disarmament even if the Soviet Union does not. Finally, they are more likely to accept defeat (and avoid the use of nuclear weapons) if Soviet forces were to launch an overwhelming attack against Western Europe.

With respect to Canadian policy, men are more likely to favour continued testing of the cruise missile and to reject the idea of Canada becoming a nuclear weapon-free zone. Women, on the other hand, are more likely to advocate disallowing further testing of the cruise missile and to support declaration of a nuclear weapon-free zone. Men also tend more to assert Canada has no influence internationally while women tend more to maintain that it has a little influence.

(iii) Language

Much more than age and gender differences, language differences have played a long and powerful role in Canadian political life. They have exerted in two world wars in the twentieth century a particularly potent force on Canada's international policies and, if not on its defence commitments per se, then at least on how they were made and implemented. The traditional isolationism of Quebec on international issues was both a reflection of the province's unique linguistic heritage and also a result of that linguistic uniqueness.

It is not surprising historically that attitudes about international peace and security differ between Canada's two major language groups. That they do, however, is clearer than why they differ in the way they do.

The peace and security attitudes of Canada's French-speaking population appear both more traditional and more radical than those of their English-speaking counterparts. (See Appendix C, Tables 3A to 3D.) There is a tendency, on the one hand, for francophones to hold views of the Soviet Union reminiscent of the cold war. Thus they tend more to agree that the USSR has superior military capability and presents a growing military threat, to agree the West cannot trust the Soviet Union, to agree the Soviet Union always seems to be the winner in arms control negotiations, and to expect a war sooner or later with the USSR. They are also more of the view that the West should take steps to defeat communism and less convinced that there can be no victors in a nuclear war.

Francophones tend, on the other hand, to be the most critical of both superpowers. Thus they are more likely than anglophones to regard the arms race as the greatest threat to

world peace, to have little confidence in the policies of either superpower, to believe neither genuinely wants disarmament, and to expect both to be responsible for a nuclear war.

At the same time, francophones tend to be significantly, although sometimes only modestly, more supportive of certain arms control proposals. These include the West starting to disarm unilaterally, the comprehensive test ban, the idea of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, declaration of Canada as a nuclear weapon-free zone, and refusal of continued testing of the cruise missile. On the other hand, they are less positive about some of the ideas underlying these proposals. Francophones are less likely than anglophones to think that arms reductions will increase security, that a continued arms buildup will lead to war, and that both sides are deterred from a nuclear attack.

(iv) Region

Regional differences have long made their mark on the Canadian political fabric, though certainly more often on matters of domestic policy than foreign policy. Perhaps especially on international peace and security issues, regional differences might not be expected to be of much significance, given the common-good quality of national security. They do consistently emerge in this survey, but in a manner that permits only a brief discussion. In short, the regional differences on Canadians' attitudes on peace and security consist almost entirely in differences between Quebec, on the one hand, and the other regions of the country, on the other. Virtually all, therefore, are noted in the preceding discussion on language differences.

Conclusions

Canadians are deeply skeptical of the strategic and foreign policies followed by both superpowers over the course of the 1970s and 1980s. Most Canadians now perceive the policies and weaponry of both superpowers, not just the USSR, as the major problem in East-West relations. The present nuclear stockpiles of both superpowers are now regarded as increasing the likelihood of war rather than decreasing it. And, perhaps most strikingly, compared to earlier years, Canadians have developed a rather negative evaluation of American aims and policies while becoming less suspicious of, and less negative toward, some Soviet aims and policies.

It is important to be clear what these findings about Canadian attitudes do not show. They do not suggest a rampant anti-Americanism. It is not America Canadians are negative about, nor Americans. It is certain American policies. Nor do these findings provide evidence of some sort of "moral equivalence" or "moral equidistance" thinking. There is no equivalence of Soviet and American social or political systems implied here. There is strong evidence, however, of a new tendency to distrust and be critical of the actions of both superpowers, of a new anti-superpowerism.

It would also be tempting but wrong to cast Canadians' negative images of American policies as entirely a product of the Reagan era. The American defence buildup of the 1980s and the tough talk of various US spokesmen have undoubtedly had some impact on Canadian and other allied publics views. But the sources of discontent are also deeper.

The new mood would seem to arise from the high hopes, but ultimate failure, of the detente period, and, especially, from the promise, but now widely recognized illusion, of US-USSR

arms control in the 1970s. SALT I and SALT II, most people appear to understand, controlled only the rate of growth of superpower nuclear weapons. The consequences of this fact, the enormous arsenals which are yet to be reduced even after last month's summit, and the technological race which continues as yet unabated, are widely deplored by the public in Canada as in other Western countries. And the argument that the weapons are, on our side, necessary for maintaining our security, is simply no longer accepted.

That a start has been made to reducing these arsenals may well cause a shift in some perceptions. No radical alteration should be expected in the present tendency to perceive the two superpowers' policies in a more equivalent light. Rather, the December summit in Washington will probably result in a more positive view of both Soviet and American arms control and foreign policies alike.

The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement, however welcome, is unlikely to be seen by most Western publics as an American accomplishment. It is therefore unlikely to be of relative advantage to Washington in influencing Western publics. Nor is the agreement likely to be seen as sufficient by itself to solve the security problem central to Canadians and others today--an overabundance of military weaponry and decided lack of political accommodation.

These attitudes, distinctly post-cold war and post-detente in nature, seem destined to play a continuing and key role in future policy debates within Canada and the Western alliance.

The present evidence for these attitudes is in some cases very strong and in others less so. The evidence seems generally sufficient though to begin to raise doubts about the

sort of conventional wisdoms concerning public opinion cited at the outset of this paper. Clearly, public opinion on these matters is not entirely inconsistent and illogical. Nor is it so badly uninformed as to be incoherent. It is neither one-sidedly pacifist nor bellicose, neither rabidly appeasement-oriented nor overly hostile. And, most obviously, it is not in fickle-fashion swaying back and forth between protest and passivity.

Well before the INF agreement of December 1987 there was strong public support in Canada, and in other Western countries, for the sort of nuclear arms reductions of which that treaty marks a beginning. There was also strong support of the basic principles of nuclear deterrence. Canadians appear to be neither dupes nor mere camp followers on these issues. Thus, far from being the sort of unpredictable and unreliable force in the making of security policy it is often pictured to be, public opinion emerges in this study as a stable and reasonable factor on these policies.

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APPENDIX A

CIIPS SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE AND RESULTS

Question: 1

How well informed would you say you are with respect to world affairs and foreign policy issues?

Breakdown:	Responses:
13%	1. very well informed
54%	2. somewhat informed
29%	3. not too informed
5%	4. not at all informed
Total 101%	

(N.B. Percentages may exceed 100% due to rounding)

Question: 2

When you think of the state of Soviet-American relations during the past 2 to 3 years are you...very concerned, somewhat concerned, not very concerned, or not at all concerned?

Breakdown:	Responses:
19%	1. very concerned
54%	2. somewhat concerned
24%	3. not very concerned
3%	4. not at all concerned
Total 100%	

Question: 3

Over the past 2 or 3 years, do you believe Soviet-American relations have improved, remained about the same, or deteriorated?

Breakdown:	Responses:
35%	1. improved
52%	2. remained about the same
14%	3. deteriorated
Total 101%	

Question: 4a

(If answer above was "improved") Which country do you think is mainly responsible for the improved relations between the East and West?

Breakdown:	Responses:	
3%	1.	the United States
13%	2.	the Soviet Union
17%	3.	both countries
66%	4.	no answer
Total 99%		

Question: 4b

(If answer above was "worsened") Which country do you think is mainly responsible for the worsened relations between the East and West?

Breakdown:	Responses:	
4%	1.	the United States
1%	2.	the Soviet Union
8%	3.	both countries
1%	4.	neither country
86%	5.	no answer
Total 100%		

Question: 5

How much confidence do you have in the ability of the United States to deal wisely with present world problems?

Breakdown:	Responses:	
3%	1.	very great
34%	2.	considerable
46%	3.	little
13%	4.	very little
4%	5.	none
Total 100%		

Question: 6

How much confidence do you have in the ability of the Soviet Union to deal wisely with present world problems?

Breakdown:	Responses:
2%	1. very great
26%	2. considerable
49%	3. little
16%	4. very little
8%	5. none
Total 101%	

Question: 7

Which one of the following situations do you think poses the greatest threat to world peace?

Breakdown:	Responses:
5%	1. Soviet actions on the international scene
8%	2. United States actions on the international scene
27%	3. the superpowers arms race
29%	4. the spread of nuclear arms to smaller countries
27%	4. the Middle East situation
4%	5. conflicts elsewhere in the world
Total 100%	

Question: 8

Some people think that the best way to prevent war is for the West to increase its military strength so as to be more powerful than the Soviets. Others think that this would speed up the arms race and may lead to war. What do you think? Should the West try to increase its military strength or not?

Breakdown:	Responses:
29%	1. yes, should increase
71%	2. no, should not increase
Total 100%	

Question: 9a

Would you say there is much danger of nuclear war or not much danger?

Breakdown:	Responses:
55%	1. much danger
46%	2. not much danger
Total 101%	

Question: 9b

Whether you believe there is much danger or there is not much danger, are the chances of nuclear war breaking out greater, less, or the same as they were ten years ago?

Breakdown:	Responses:
44%	1. greater
25%	2. less
31%	3. the same
Total 100%	

Question: 10a

Which do you think is a more likely cause of a nuclear war, a nuclear attack triggered by accident or a deliberate attack?

Breakdown:	Responses:
57%	1. attack triggered by accident
42%	2. deliberate attack
Total 99%	

Question: 10b

Whichever you believe is more likely - an accidental or deliberate attack - who is most likely to be responsible for it?

Breakdown:	Responses:
11%	1. the Soviet Union
9%	2. the United States
40%	3. both superpowers
40%	4. some other country
Total 100%	

Question: 11

In terms of their overall military strength, do you think the Soviet Union and its allies are superior, inferior, or roughly equal to the military strength of the United States and its allies?

Breakdown:	Responses:
31%	1. superior
7%	2. inferior
62%	3. roughly equal
100%	Total

Question: 12

Is the Soviet Union more or less content with its power or influence in the world today, or is it trying to increase its area of influence?

Breakdown:	Responses:
21%	1. more or less content
79%	2. trying to increase area of influence
100%	Total

Question: 13

Is the United States more or less content with its power or influence in the world today, or is it trying to increase its area of influence?

Breakdown:	Responses:
19%	1. more or less content
80%	2. trying to increase area of influence
99%	Total

Question: 14

Do you think the Western countries can continue to live peacefully with the Soviets, or do you think there is bound to be a major war sooner or later with the Soviets?

Breakdown:	Responses:
45%	1. can live peacefully
15%	2. will be war
39%	3. undecided
99%	Total

Question: 15

Some people believe that the Soviet leaders do not genuinely want disarmament. Other people believe that they do genuinely want disarmament. Which of these views is closest to your own?

Breakdown:	Responses:
54%	1. do not want disarmament
46%	2. do want disarmament
100%	Total

Question: 16

Some people believe that American leaders do not genuinely want disarmament. Other people believe that they do genuinely want disarmament. Which of these views is closest to your own?

Breakdown:	Responses:
62%	1. do not want disarmament
36%	2. do want disarmament
98%	Total

Question: 17a

For each description or statement below, please "X" the box which represents the extent to which you agree or disagree with each description or statement. If you strongly agree with the statement "X" the first box over the "strongly agree" column. If you strongly disagree with the statement "X" the box over the "strongly disagree" column. Some peoples' answers fall somewhere in between these two points depending on how they feel about the statement or description.....The security of Western countries could best be increased by substantial reductions in both American and Soviet nuclear weapons.

Breakdown:	Responses:
34%	1. strongly agree
47%	2. agree
15%	3. disagree
3%	4. strongly disagree
99%	Total

Question: 17b

...please [indicate] the extent to which you agree or disagree with each description or statement....The Soviet military threat is constantly growing and represents a real, immediate threat to the West.

Breakdown:	Responses:
12%	1. strongly agree
46%	2. agree
38%	3. disagree
4%	4. strongly disagree
100%	Total

Question: 17c

...please [indicate] the extent to which you agree or disagree with each description or statement....The West should take all steps to defeat Communism even if it means risking nuclear war.

Breakdown:	Responses:
3%	1. strongly agree
12%	2. agree
45%	3. disagree
41%	4. strongly disagree
101%	Total

Question: 17d

...please [indicate] the extent to which you agree or disagree with each description or statement...We cannot trust the Soviets, so we shouldn't try to negotiate arms control with them.

Breakdown:	Responses:
5%	1. strongly agree
16%	2. agree
53%	3. disagree
26%	4. strongly disagree
Total 100%	

Question: 17e

...please [indicate] the extent to which you agree or disagree with each description or statement....Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is likely to launch a nuclear attack because both know the other would retaliate.

Breakdown:	Responses:
31%	1. strongly agree
55%	2. agree
13%	3. disagree
2%	4. strongly disagree
Total 101%	

Question: 17f

...please [indicate] the extent to which you agree or disagree with each description or statement....The West should start to disarm even if the Soviet Union does not.

Breakdown:	Responses:
4%	1. strongly agree
21%	2. agree
53%	3. disagree
22%	4. strongly disagree
Total 100%	

Question: 17g

..please [indicate] the extent to which you agree or disagree with each description or statement....The Soviets always seem to be the winners in any negotiated arms agreement with Western countries.

Breakdown:	Responses:
4%	1. strongly agree
33%	2. agree
59%	3. disagree
4%	4. strongly disagree
Total 100%	

Question: 17h

...please [indicate] the extent to which you agree or disagree with each description or statement....There can be no winners in a global nuclear war.

Breakdown:	Responses:
81%	1. strongly agree
15%	2. agree
3%	3. disagree
1%	4. strongly disagree
Total 100%	

Question: 17i

...please [indicate] the extent to which you agree or disagree with each description or statement....If both sides continue to build more nuclear weapons sooner or later there will be a nuclear war.

Breakdown:	Responses:
26%	1. strongly agree
46%	2. agree
25%	3. disagree
3%	4. strongly disagree
Total 100%	

Question: 18a

How trustworthy would you say President Reagan is on nuclear and arms control issues?

Breakdown:	Responses:
5%	1. very trustworthy
47%	2. somewhat trustworthy
34%	3. not very trustworthy
14%	4. not at all trustworthy
Total 100%	

Question: 18b

How trustworthy would you say the Soviet leader, Mr. Gorbachev is on nuclear and arms control issues?

Breakdown:	Responses:
3%	1. very trustworthy
55%	2. somewhat trustworthy
34%	3. not very trustworthy
9%	4. not at all trustworthy
Total 101%	

Question: 19

In general terms, how much influence do you think Canada, as a nation, has on the course of world events.

Breakdown:	Responses:
4%	1. a great deal of influence
32%	2. some influence
52%	3. very little influence
12%	4. no influence at all
Total 100%	

Question: 20

From what you know or have read, do you think Canadian defence forces should be larger, about the present size, or smaller?

Breakdown:	Responses:
63%	1. larger
33%	2. about the present size
5%	3. smaller
Total 101%	

Question: 21

There has been talk about the Canadian military forces in Europe. Do you think that we should increase the size of our armed forces in Europe, their size is just about right, their size should be reduced, or should all Canadian military forces in Europe be withdrawn?

Breakdown:	Responses:
23%	1. we should increase the size of our armed forces in Europe
49%	2. their size is just about right
10%	3. their size should be reduced
19%	4. all Canadian military forces in Europe should be withdrawn
Total 101%	

Question: 22

If NATO forces in Western Europe were being overwhelmed by a conventional attack from the Soviet Union do you think that the West should accept defeat and Soviet control of Europe or make use of nuclear weapons and risk global nuclear war?

Breakdown:	Responses:
52%	1. accept defeat and Soviet control of Europe
31%	2. make use of nuclear weapons and risk global nuclear war
17%	3. no answer
Total 100%	

Question: 23a

Until recently there has been little progress in the disarmament talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Which country do you think has been holding up these discussions?

Breakdown:	Responses:
11%	1. Soviet Union
14%	2. United States
75%	3. both countries
100%	Total

Question: 23b

Between the Soviets and the Americans, who do you think is more responsible for holding up disarmament negotiations?

Breakdown:	Responses:
14%	1. Soviet Union
14%	2. United States
72%	3. equally
100%	Total

Question: 24

Still thinking about the disarmament negotiations...which of the following statements is closer to your point of view? We should not agree to any substantial disarmament unless inspection of nuclear facilities in all countries is so careful that there is little risk of cheating. Or, no inspection system is perfect. We should be willing to accept some risks to get a disarmament agreement?

Breakdown:	Responses:
53%	1. We should not agree to any substantial disarmament unless inspection of nuclear facilities in all countries is so careful that there is little risk of cheating.
47%	2. No inspection system is perfect. We should be willing to accept some risks to get a disarmament agreement.
100%	Total

Question: 25

There has been a great deal of debate on the need for a complete ban on the testing of all nuclear weapons both in the air and underground. Some people say that the maintenance of a strong deterrence force can be guaranteed only by regular testing of existing and experimental future nuclear weapons. Which one opinion is closest to your own?

Breakdown:	Responses:
19%	1. permit testing of nuclear weapons
81%	2. totally ban nuclear weapons testing
Total 100%	

Question: 26

Some people have suggested that Canada should become a nuclear weapons-free zone, that is, that it should not allow any nuclear weapons on or over its territory. Others say that such a policy would weaken the western alliance and cause serious problems with Canada's allies, especially the United States. Which position do you most agree with?

Breakdown:	Responses:
57%	1. Canada should become a nuclear weapons-free zone
43%	2. Canada should not become a nuclear weapons--free zone
Total 100%	

Question: 27

The Reagan Administration recently decided to exceed the limits for nuclear weapons as set out in the SALT II agreement. Given that Ottawa has allowed testing of cruise missiles in Canada on the understanding that the United States would continue to pursue arms reductions with the Soviet Union, should the Canadian government now refuse permission for further such tests or not?

Breakdown:	Responses:
68%	1. yes, Canada should refuse to allow further cruise testing
32%	2. no, Canada should allow further testing
Total 100%	

Question: 28a

...please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement....To preserve peace in Europe, Canada should press for a strengthened NATO rather than always calling for arms reductions.

Breakdown:	Responses:
7%	1. 1 totally disagree
4%	2. 2
10%	3. 3
10%	4. 4
19%	5. 5
7%	6. 6
11%	7. 7
12%	8. 8
5%	9. 9
16%	10. 10 totally agree
Total 101%	

Question: 28b

...please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement....The only way we can prevent a nuclear war is by making sure that both the Soviets and Americans have enough weapons to discourage the other from attacking.

Breakdown:	Responses:
25%	1. 1 totally disagree
8%	2. 2
13%	3. 3
6%	4. 4
13%	5. 5
6%	6. 6
6%	7. 7
5%	8. 8
6%	9. 9
13%	10. 10 totally agree
Total 101%	

Question: 28c

...please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement....Even though Canada is a member of NATO, I tend to think of Canada as being neutral between the two superpowers.

Breakdown:	Responses:
8%	1. 1 totally disagree
6%	2. 2
12%	3. 3
7%	4. 4
11%	5. 5
7%	6. 6
10%	7. 7
14%	8. 8
8%	9. 9
17%	10. 10 totally agree
Total 100%	

Question: 28d

...please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement....It's time Western Europe took more responsibility for its own defence; Canada and the United States should press them to do so.

Breakdown:	Responses:
4%	1. 1 totally disagree
3%	2. 2
6%	3. 3
7%	4. 4
15%	5. 5
9%	6. 6
13%	7. 7
18%	8. 8
9%	9. 9
16%	10. 10 totally agree
Total 100%	

Question: 28e

...please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement....Although its been over 40 years since we have had a World War, it is still necessary to maintain a military balance in Europe to prevent open aggression and hostilities.

Breakdown:	Responses:	
4%	1.	1 totally disagree
4%	2.	2
6%	3.	3
5%	4.	4
11%	5.	5
9%	6.	6
12%	7.	7
17%	8.	8
11%	9.	9
21%	10.	10 totally agree
Total 100%		

ANNEXE B

VERSION FRANCAISE DU QUESTIONNAIRE

Le lecteur trouvera à l'annexe A, sous forme de tableaux, la présentation combinée des résultats du sondage effectué auprès des répondants anglophones et francophones. Pour obtenir une ventilation en fonction de la langue, voir l'annexe C.

1. À votre avis, à quel point êtes-vous bien informé(e) en ce qui concerne les affaires internationales et les questions de politique étrangère? Diriez-vous que vous êtes .. (COCHEZ "X" CASE CI-DESSOUS)

très bien informé(e) -------- ( )1
assez informé(e) ------------ ( )2
pas trop informé(e) --------- ( )3
Ou pas informé(e) du tout ------ ( )4

2. Lorsque vous pensez à l'état des relations entre l'Union soviétique et les États-Unis dans le courant des 2 ou 3 dernières années, êtes-vous ...? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

très inquiet/inquiète ------- ( )1
assez inquiet/inquiète ------ ( )2
pas très inquiet/inquiète --- ( )3
Ou pas inquiet/inquiète du tout- ( )4

3. Au cours des 2 ou 3 dernières années, croyez-vous que les relations entre l'Union soviétique et les États-Unis ...? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

se sont améliorées ---------- ( )1 → ALLEZ À LA QU.4a
sont restées à peu près pareilles- ( )2 → ALLEZ À LA QU.5
Ou se sont détériorées ---------- ( )3 → ALLEZ À LA QU.4b

4a) À votre avis, lequel des deux pays est surtout responsable de l'amélioration des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

Les États-Unis ---------- ( )1
L'Union soviétique ---------- ( )2
Les deux pays ---------- ( )3 → ALLEZ À LA QU.5
Ou Ni l'un ni l'autre des deux pays - ( )4

4b) À votre avis, lequel des deux pays est surtout responsable de la détérioration des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

Les États-Unis ---------- ( )1

L'Union soviétique ---------- ( )2

Les deux pays ---------- ( )3

Ou Ni l'un ni l'autre des deux pays- ( )4

5. Comment qualifieriez-vous le niveau de confiance que vous avez en l'aptitude des États-Unis à s'occuper sagement des problèmes mondiaux actuels? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

Très grand ---------- ( )1

Considérable ---------- ( )2

Faible ---------- ( )3

Très faible ---------- ( )4

Ou Aucune confiance ------- ( )5

6. Comment qualifieriez-vous le niveau de confiance que vous avez en l'aptitude de l'Union soviétique à s'occuper sagement des problèmes mondiaux actuels? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

Très grand ---------- ( )1

Considérable ---------- ( )2

Faible ---------- ( )3

Très faible ---------- ( )4

Ou Aucune confiance ------- ( )5

7. LAQUELLE des situations suivantes constitue à votre avis la menace la plus grande à la paix mondiale? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

Les actions soviétiques sur la scène internationale ---------- ( )1

Les actions des États-Unis sur la scène internationale ---------- ( )2

La course aux armements des superpuissances ---------- ( )3

Le déploiement des armes nucléaires dans les pays plus petits ---------- ( )4

La situation prévalant au Moyen-Orient- ( )5

Ou Les conflits ailleurs dans le monde --- ( )6

8. Certaines personnes pensent que la meilleure façon d'empêcher la guerre est que l'Ouest accroisse sa force militaire de sorte qu'il soit plus puissant que les Soviétiques. D'autres personnes pensent que ceci accélérerait la course aux armements et pourrait aboutir à la guerre. Qu'en pensez-vous? Est-ce que l'Ouest devrait essayer d'accoître sa force militaire, ou non? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

Oui, devrait accroître ---------- ( )1

Ou Non, ne devrait pas accroître --------- ( )2

9a) Diriez-vous qu'il existe un grand danger de guerre nucléaire ou pas beaucoup de danger? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

Beaucoup de danger ---------- ( )1

Pas beaucoup de danger ------ ( )2

9b) Que vous croyez qu'il existe un grand danger ou pas beaucoup de danger, est-ce que la chance de l'éclatement d'une guerre nucléaire est plus grande ou moins grande qu'elle ne l'était il y a dix ans? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

Plus grande ------- ( )1

Moins grande ------ ( )2

Ou Égale ---------- ( )3

10a) À votre avis, qu'est-ce qui causera plus probablement une guerre nucléaire, une attaque nucléaire déclenchée par accident ou une attaque préméditée? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

Attaque déclenchée par accident -- ( )1

Attaque préméditée ---------- ( )2

10b) Peu importe ce qui surviendra plus probablement à votre avis, une attaque accidentelle ou une attaque préméditée, qui en sera le plus probablement responsable? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

L'Union soviétique ---------- ( )1

Les États-Unis ---------- ( )2

Les deux superpuissances ---- ( )3

Ou Un autre pays quelconque ---- ( )4

11. Du point de vue de la force militaire globale, croyez-vous que l'Union soviétique et ses alliés soient supérieurs, inférieurs ou à peu près égaux à la puissance militaire des États-Unis et de ses alliés? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

Supérieurs -------- ( )1

Inférieurs -------- ( )2

Ou À peu près égaux -- ( )3

12. Est-ce que l'Union soviétique est plus ou moins satisfaite de sa puissance ou son influence dans le monde d'aujourd'hui, ou essaie-t-elle d'accroître son cercle d'influence? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

Plus ou moins satisfaite --------- ( )1

Essaie d'accroître son cercle d'influence ---------- ( )2

13. Est-ce que les États-Unis sont plus ou moins satisfaits de leur puissance ou leur influence dans le monde d'aujourd'hui ou essaient-ils d'accroître leur cercle d'influence? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

Plus ou moins satisfaits --------- ( )1

Essaient d'accroître leur cercle d'influence ---------- ( )2

14. Pensez-vous que les pays de l'Ouest puissent continuer à vivre en paix avec les Soviétiques ou pensez-vous que tôt ou tard une guerre de grande ampleur aura lieu avec les Soviétiques? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

Peuvent vivre en paix ------- ( )1

Il y aura une guerre -------- ( )2

Ou Indécis(e) ---------- ( )3

15. Certaines personnes croient que les dirigeants soviétiques ne veulent pas sincèrement le désarmement. D'autres personnes croient qu'effectivement ils veulent sincèrement le désarmement.

Laquelle de ces deux opinions se rapproche le plus de la vôtre? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE)

Ne veulent pas le désarmement ---- ( )1

Veulent le désarmement ---------- ( )2

16. Certaines personnes croient que les dirigeants américains ne veulent pas sincèrement le désarmement. D'autres personnes croient qu'effectivement ils veulent sincèrement le désarmement.

Laquelle de ces deux opinions se rapproche le plus de la vôtre? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

Ne veulent pas le désarmement ---- ( )1

Veulent le désarmement ---------- ( )2

17. Pour chaque description ou énoncé ci-dessous, je vous prie de cocher "X" la case qui représente dans quelle mesure vous êtes en accord ou en désaccord avec chaque description ou énoncé.

Si vous êtes vraiment en accord avec l'énoncé, cochez "X" la première case dans la colonne "Vraiment en accord". Si vous êtes vraiment en désaccord avec l'énoncé, cochez "X" la case dans la colonne "vraiment en désaccord". Les réponses de certaines personne si situent quelque part entre ces deux points, tout dépendant de leur sentiment concernant l'énoncé ou la description. (POUR CHACUN DES ÉNONCÉS CI-DESSOUS, COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE)

	Vraiment en accord	Accord	Dés-accord	Vraiment en dés-accord
La sécurité des pays de l'Ouest serait accrue de façon optimale par des réductions substantielles des arsenals nucléaires américains et soviétiques ----------	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4
La menace militaire soviétique est en croissance constante et présente un danger réel et immédiat pour l'Ouest ----------	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4

	Vraiment en accord	Accord	Dés-accord	Vraiment en dés-accord
L'Ouest devrait prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour vaincre le communisme, même si cela signifie riquer une guerre nucléaire ----	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4
Nous ne pouvons pas faire confiance aux Soviétiques; nous ne devrions donc pas essayer de négocier le contrôle des armements avec eux --	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4
Il est improbable que les États-Unis ou l'Union Soviétique déclenchent une attaque nucléaire parce qu'ils savent tous les deux que l'autre répliquerait ----------	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4
L'Ouest devrait commencer à se désarmer, même si l'Union soviétique ne le fait pas ----------	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4
Il semble que les Soviétiques sortent toujours gagnants de tout accord sur les armements négocié avec les pays de l'Ouest ----------	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4
Il ne saurait y avoir de gagnant à une guerre nucléaire à l'échelle mondiale ----------	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4
Si les deux côtés continuent de construire de plus en plus d'armes nucléaires, tôt ou tard il y aura une guerre nucléaire ----------	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4

18a) À quel point diriez-vous que le Président Reagan est digne de confiance sur les questions nucléaires et de contrôle des armements? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

Très digne de confiance ---- ( )1

Assez digne de confiance ---- ( )2

Assez indigne de confiance -- ( )3

Ou Très indigne de confiance --- ( )4

18b) Et à quel point diriez-vous que le chef soviétique, Monsieur Gorbachev, est digne de confiance sur les questions nucléaires et de contrôle des armements? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

Très digne de confiance ---- ( )1

Assez digne de confiance ---- ( )2

Assez indigne de confiance -- ( )3

Ou Très indigne de confiance --- ( )4

19. De manière générale, à votre avis combien d'influence le Canada a-t-il, en tant que nation, sur le cours des événements mondiaux? Diriez-vous que le Canada a ...? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

beaucoup d'influence -------- ( )1

une certaine influence ------ ( )2

très peu d'influence -------- ( )3

Ou pas d'influence du tout ----- ( )4

20. D'après ce que vous savez ou avez lu, à votre avis est-ce que les forces de défense du Canada devraient être ...? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

plus grandes ---------- ( )1

à peu près de la même grandeur --- ( )2

Ou plus petites ---------- ( )3

21. Il a été question des forces militaires canadiennes en Europe. Pensez-vous ...? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

que nous devrions augmenter l'importance de nos forces armées en Europe ---------- ( )1

que l'importance des forces armées est juste ce qu'il faut ---------- ( )2

que leur importance devrait être réduite --- ( )3

Ou que toutes les forces militaires canadiennes devraient quitter l'Europe ---------- ( )4

22. Si les forces de l'OTAN en Europe occidentale étaient écrasées par une attaque conventionnelle de l'Union soviétique, pensez-vous que l'Ouest devrait ... (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

accepter la défaite et le contrôle soviétique de l'Europe ---------- ( )1

Ou se servir d'armes nucléaires et risquer un guerre nucléaire à l'échelle mondiale ---------- ( )2

23a) Jusqu'à récemment, il y a eu peu de progrès dans les pourparlers sur le désarmement entre les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique. À votre avis, lequel des deux pays retarde ces discussions? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE)

L'Union soviétique ----- ( )1 → ALLEZ À LA QU.24

Les États-Unis --------- ( )2 → ALLEZ À LA QU.24

Ou Les deux pays ---------- ( )3 → ALLEZ À LA QU.23b

23b) Des Soviétiques ou des Américains, qui à votre avis est plus responsable du retard des négociations sur le désarmement? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

Davantage l'Union soviétique ----- ( )1

Davantage les États-Unis --------- ( )2

Ou Également ---------- ( )3

24. Pensant toujours aux négociations sur le désarmement ... lequel des énoncés suivants se rapproche le plus de votre point de vue? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

Nous ne devrions donner notre accord à aucun désarmement substantiel à moins que l'inspection des installations nucléaires de tous les pays ne soit si méticuleuse qu'il n'y ait aucun risque de tricherie --- ( )1

Ou Aucun système d'inspection n'est parfait. Nous devrions être disposés à accepter certains risques afin d'obtenir un accord sur le désarmement ---------- ( )2

25. Il y a eu beaucoup de discussions sur la nécessité d'une interdiction complète des essais de toutes les armes nucléaires, que ces essais soient aériens ou souterrains. Certaines personnes disent que le maintien d'une force de dissuasion puissante peut être garantie uniquement par des essais réguliers des armes nucléaires existantes et des armes nucléaires expérimentales qui seront mises au point.

D'autres personnes disent que pour mettre un terme à la course aux armements nous devons arrêter la mise au point de nouvelles armes et qu'une interdiction totale de tous les essais contribuerait à parvenir à ce résultat.

LAQUELLE des ces opinions se rapproche le plus de la vôtre? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

Permettre l'essai des armes nucléaires ------- ( )1

Interdire tous les essais d'armes nucléaires - ( )2

26. Certaines personnes ont suggéré que le Canada devienne une zone exempte d'armes nucléaires; autrement dit, qu'il ne devrait accepter aucune arme nucléaire sur ou au-dessus de son territoire.

D'autres personnes disent qu'une telle politique affaiblirait l'alliance des pays occidentaux et poserait des problèmes sérieux aux alliés du Canada, particulièrement aux États-Unis.

Avec laquelle de ces positions êtes-vous le plus en accord? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

Le Canada devrait devenir une zone exempte d'armes nucléaires ---------- ( )1

Le Canada ne devrait pas devenir une zone exempte d'armes nucléaires ---------- ( )2

27. Le gouvernement Reagan a récemment décidé de passer outre aux limites pour les armes nucléaires établies lors des accords SALT II. Étant donné qu'Ottawa a permis l'essai de missiles de croisière au Canada à condition que les États-Unis continuent à rechercher la réduction des armements en compagnie de l'Union soviétique, est-ce que le gouvernement du Canada devrait maintenant refuser ou non la permission d'effectuer d'autres essais du genre? (COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)

Oui, le Canada devrait refuser de permettre d'autres essais des missiles de croisière - ( )1

Non, le Canada devrait permettre aux essais de continuer ---------- ( )2

28. Cette question porte sur des descriptions ou énoncés concernant le contrôle des armements et les relations Est-Ouest. Vous basant sur ce que vous savez peut-être ou sur ce que vous pouvez avoir entendu ou lu, je vous prie d'indiquer dans quelle mesure vous êtes en accord ou en désaccord avec les énoncés.

Pour chaque description ou énoncé, je vous prie de cocher "X" la case qui représente dans quelle mesure vous êtes en accord ou en désaccord avec la description ou l'énoncé.

Si vous êtes "tout à fait en accord" qu'il s'agit d'une bonne description, vous cocheriez la case dans la colonne "tout à fait en accord". Si vous êtes "tout à fait en désaccord", vous cocheriez la case dans la colonne "tout à fait en désaccord".

Les réponses de certaines personnes se situent quelque part entre ces deux points tout dépendant de leur sentiment concernant l'énoncé ou la description. (POUR CHACUN DES ÉNONCÉS CI-DESSOUS, COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE)

	Tout à fait en désaccord									Tout à fait en accord
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Afin de préserver la paix en Europe, le Canada devrait faire pression pour un OTAN plus fort au lieu de toujours demander la réduction des armements	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
Le seul moyen dont nous disposons pour empêcher une guerre nucléaire est de s'assurer que les Soviétiques et les Américains aient tous deux assez d'armements pour décourager une attaque de l'autre	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
Même si le Canada est membre de l'OTAN, j'ai quand même tendance à penser au Canada comme un pays neutre entre les deux superpuissances	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
Le temps est venu pour l'Europe occidentale de prendre une plus grande responsabilité pour sa propre défense; le Canada et les États-Unis devraient faire pression en ce sens	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
Bien que plus de 40 ans se soient écoulés depuis notre plus récente guerre mondiale, il est encore nécessaire de maintenir un équilibre militaire en Europe, afin d'empêcher des actes ouverts d'agression et des hostilités	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )

APPENDIX C

DATA TABLES ON PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Table 1A Perceptions of the Superpowers by Age

	AGE		
	18 to 34 years	35 to 54 years	55 years and over
Confidence in US			
considerable	38%	37%	35%
little	62%	63%	65%
Confidence in USSR			
considerable	25%	28%	30%
little	75%	72%	70%
USSR strength vs US			
inferior	8%	7%	5%
roughly equal	59%	66%	62%
superior	33%	28%	33%
Is USSR content with influence?			
content	21%	17%	25%
increasing influence	79%	83%	75%
Is US content with influence?			
content	22%	15%	21%
increasing influence	78%	85%	79%
USSR desire for disarm			
do not want disarmament	56%	56%	50%
want disarmament	44%	44%	50%
US desire for disarm			
do not want disarmament	61%	65%	65%
want disarmament	39%	35%	35%
Trust of Reagan on arms control			
somewhat trustworthy	52%	51%	50%
not very trustworthy	47%	48%	49%
Trust of Gorb on arms control			
somewhat trustworthy	54%	60%	54%
not very trustworthy	44%	39%	44%

Table 1B Perceptions of Threats to Security by Age

	AGE		
	18 to 34 years	35 to 54 years	55 years and over
Greatest threat to peace			
USSR actions	4%	4%	7%
arms race	33%	22%	24%
US actions	8%	8%	9%
other	55%	65%	59%
Danger of nuclear war			
much	61%	55%	45%
not much	39%	45%	55%
Danger of war compared to 10 years ago			
greater	58%	43%	24%
same	25%	30%	41%
less	17%	26%	34%
Nuclear war most likely due to:			
accident	51%	62%	62%
deliberate	49%	38%	38%
Most likely responsible for nuclear war			
USSR	13%	10%	8%
US	9%	6%	12%
both	44%	39%	37%
other	33%	45%	44%
US-USSR relations in last 2-3 years have:			
improved	27%	40%	38%
stayed the same	54%	48%	52%
deteriorated	19%	12%	9%
War or peace likely with USSR?			
peace	37%	51%	51%
war	44%	36%	37%
undecided	19%	13%	13%
USSR a military threat			
agree	60%	56%	59%
disagree	40%	44%	41%

Table 1C Attitudes on Security by Age

	AGE		
	18 to 34 years	35 to 54 years	55 years and over
Security increased by nuclear arms reductions			
agree	80%	82%	84%
disagree	20%	18%	16%
West increase military strength			
yes	24%	30%	34%
no	76%	70%	66%
US-USSR unlkly to use nuclear weapons			
strongly agree	30%	29%	34%
agree	49%	59%	58%
disagree	21%	12%	8%
PREVENT N-WAR BY WEAPONS			
strongly disagree	35%	35%	27%
disagree	33%	35%	26%
agree	16%	17%	18%
strongly agree	17%	13%	28%
Arms race will lead to war			
strongly agree	31%	24%	20%
agree	41%	47%	51%
disagree	28%	28%	30%
West should defeat Communism			
agree	13%	11%	23%
disagree	40%	49%	46%
strongly disagree	48%	39%	32%
Can't trust USSR			
agree	15%	19%	32%
disagree	85%	81%	68%
West should disarm			
agree	27%	24%	22%
disagree	51%	54%	57%
strongly disagree	22%	22%	21%
EUROPEAN MIL. BALANCE NEEDED			
strongly disagree	8%	8%	9%
disagree	22%	24%	18%

(continued)

Table 1C Attitudes on Security by Age

	AGE		
	18 to 34 years	35 to 54 years	55 years and over
agree	44%	38%	31%
strongly agree	26%	30%	41%

Table 1D Attitudes on Canadian Policy by Age

	AGE		
	18 to 34 years	35 to 54 years	55 years and over
Influence of Cda in world			
some influence	32%	35%	43%
very little influence	55%	51%	48%
no influence	13%	14%	9%
Cda seems neutral			
strongly disagree	13%	15%	13%
disagree	31%	29%	29%
agree	36%	33%	24%
strongly agree	20%	23%	34%
Increase Cdn defence force?			
larger	63%	62%	62%
same	31%	33%	36%
smaller	6%	5%	2%
Increase Cdn forces in Europe?			
increase	24%	24%	19%
stay the same	52%	45%	49%
reduce	5%	11%	13%
withdraw	18%	19%	19%
Cdn should be nuclear free?			
become a nuclear free zone	61%	57%	51%
not become a nuclear free zone	39%	43%	49%
Refuse or allow cruise testing?			
refuse further cruise testing	74%	68%	59%
allow further cruise testing	26%	32%	41%
Cda should strengthen NATO			
strongly disagree	8%	11%	13%
disagree	48%	35%	28%
agree	31%	34%	28%
strongly agree	13%	21%	31%
Europe more responsible for defence			
strongly disagree	6%	6%	9%

(continued)

Table 1D Attitudes on Canadian Policy by Age

	AGE		
	18 to 34 years	35 to 54 years	55 years and over
disagree	35%	27%	18%
agree	43%	42%	34%
strongly agree	16%	25%	39%

Table 2A Perceptions of the Superpowers by Sex

	SEX	
	male	female
Confidence in US		
considerable	42%	32%
little	58%	68%
Confidence in USSR		
considerable	30%	25%
little	70%	75%
USSR strength vs US		
inferior	9%	4%
roughly equal	58%	66%
superior	33%	29%
Is USSR content with influence?		
content	21%	21%
increasing influence	79%	79%
Is US content with influence?		
content	22%	16%
increasing influence	78%	84%
USSR desire for disarm		
do not want disarmament	54%	55%
want disarmament	46%	45%
US desire for disarm		
do not want disarmament	59%	67%
want disarmament	41%	33%
Trust of Reagan on arms control		
somewhat trustworthy	57%	45%
not very trustworthy	41%	54%
Trust of Gorb on arms control		
somewhat trustworthy	61%	52%
not very trustworthy	38%	47%

Table 2B Perceptions of Threats to Security by Sex

	SEX	
	male	female
Greatest threat to peace		
USSR actions	6%	4%
arms race	22%	31%
US actions	6%	10%
other	66%	54%
Danger of nuclear war		
much	48%	61%
not much	52%	39%
Danger of war compared to 10 years ago		
greater	41%	48%
same	30%	33%
less	29%	20%
Nuclear war most likely due to:		
accident	57%	58%
deliberate	43%	42%
Most likely responsible for nuclear war		
USSR	12%	10%
US	6%	12%
both	37%	43%
other	45%	35%
US-USSR relations in last 2-3 years have:		
improved	39%	30%
stayed the same	49%	54%
deteriorated	12%	16%
War or peace likely with USSR?		
peace	50%	41%
war	36%	42%
undecided	14%	17%
USSR a military threat		
agree	57%	60%
disagree	43%	40%

Table 2C Attitudes on Security by Sex

	SEX	
	male	female
Security increased by nuclear arms reductions		
agree	76%	87%
disagree	24%	13%
West increase military strength		
yes	33%	24%
no	67%	76%
US-USSR unlkly to use nuclear weapons		
strongly agree	34%	28%
agree	53%	56%
disagree	13%	17%
PREVENT N-WAR BY WEAPONS		
strongly disagree	33%	33%
disagree	28%	35%
agree	17%	17%
strongly agree	22%	15%
Arms race will lead to war		
strongly agree	22%	30%
agree	45%	46%
disagree	33%	23%
West should defeat Communism		
agree	14%	16%
disagree	43%	46%
strongly disagree	43%	38%
Can't trust USSR		
agree	19%	22%
disagree	81%	78%
West should disarm		
agree	21%	28%
disagree	51%	56%
strongly disagree	28%	16%
EUROPEAN MIL. BALANCE NEEDED		
strongly disagree	8%	9%
disagree	20%	24%
agree	37%	40%

(continued)

Table 2C Attitudes on Security by Sex

	SEX	
	male	female
strongly agree	35%	28%

Table 2D Attitudes on Canadian Policy by Sex

	SEX	
	male	female
Influence of Cda in world		
some influence	36%	35%
very little influence	44%	59%
no influence	19%	6%
Cda seems neutral		
strongly disagree	18%	10%
disagree	29%	31%
agree	30%	33%
strongly agree	23%	26%
Increase Cdn defence force?		
larger	63%	62%
same	32%	34%
smaller	5%	4%
Increase Cdn forces in Europe?		
increase	25%	20%
stay the same	48%	51%
reduce	8%	11%
withdraw	19%	18%
Cdn should be nuclear free?		
become a nuclear free zone	50%	64%
not become a nuclear free zone	50%	36%
Refuse or allow cruise testing?		
refuse further cruise testing	59%	77%
allow further cruise testing	41%	23%
Cda should strengthen NATO		
strongly disagree	11%	9%
disagree	38%	39%
agree	30%	32%
strongly agree	21%	19%
Europe more responsible for defence		
strongly disagree	6%	8%
disagree	25%	30%

(continued)

Table 2D Attitudes on Canadian Policy by Sex

	SEX	
	male	female
agree	40%	41%
strongly agree	29%	21%

Table 3A Perceptions of the Superpowers by Language

	LANG	
	English	French
Confidence in US		
considerable	41%	24%
little	59%	76%
Confidence in USSR		
considerable	32%	13%
little	68%	87%
USSR strength vs US		
inferior	8%	4%
roughly equal	63%	59%
superior	29%	37%
Is USSR content with influence?		
content	22%	17%
increasing influence	78%	83%
Is US content with influence?		
content	19%	18%
increasing influence	81%	82%
USSR desire for disarm		
do not want disarmament	51%	65%
want disarmament	49%	35%
US desire for disarm		
do not want disarmament	62%	69%
want disarmament	38%	31%
Trust of Reagan on arms control		
somewhat trustworthy	51%	49%
not very trustworthy	47%	49%
Trust of Gorb on arms control		
somewhat trustworthy	57%	52%
not very trustworthy	41%	46%

Table 3B Perceptions of Threats to Security by Language

	LANG	
	English	French
Greatest threat to peace		
USSR actions	5%	4%
arms race	22%	42%
US actions	10%	2%
other	62%	52%
Danger of nuclear war		
much	53%	60%
not much	47%	40%
Danger of war compared to 10 years ago		
greater	45%	43%
same	31%	30%
less	24%	26%
Nuclear war most likely due to:		
accident	59%	52%
deliberate	41%	48%
Most likely responsible for nuclear war		
USSR	10%	13%
US	9%	6%
both	35%	57%
other	45%	24%
US-USSR relations in last 2-3 years have:		
improved	37%	25%
stayed the same	48%	63%
deteriorated	14%	12%
War or peace likely with USSR?		
peace	49%	33%
war	36%	49%
undecided	15%	18%
USSR a military threat		
agree	53%	75%
disagree	47%	25%

Table 3C Attitudes on Security by Language

	LANG	
	English	French
Security increased by nuclear arms reductions		
agree	84%	73%
disagree	16%	27%
West increase military strength		
yes	31%	20%
no	69%	80%
US-USSR unlkly to use nuclear weapons		
strongly agree	29%	35%
agree	59%	40%
disagree	12%	25%
Only prevent nuclear war by weapons		
strongly disagree	33%	31%
disagree	34%	26%
agree	18%	13%
strongly agree	15%	30%
Arms race will lead to war		
strongly agree	25%	30%
agree	45%	48%
disagree	30%	23%
West should defeat Communism		
agree	13%	20%
disagree	45%	42%
strongly disagree	41%	38%
Can't trust USSR		
agree	18%	30%
disagree	82%	70%
West should disarm		
agree	23%	30%
disagree	54%	50%
strongly disagree	22%	20%
European military balance needed		
strongly disagree	7%	11%

(continued)

Table 3C Attitudes on Security by Language

	LANG	
	English	French
disagree	23%	17%
agree	39%	37%
strongly agree	31%	35%

Table 3D Attitudes on Canadian Policy by Language

	LANG	
	English	French
Influence of Cda in world		
some influence	36%	35%
very little influence	50%	56%
no influence	14%	8%
Cda seems neutral between superpowers		
strongly disagree	14%	13%
disagree	31%	26%
agree	33%	26%
strongly agree	21%	35%
Increase Cdn defence force?		
larger	69%	41%
same	27%	53%
smaller	4%	6%
Increase Cdn forces in Europe?		
increase	24%	18%
stay the same	49%	49%
reduce	9%	11%
withdraw	18%	21%
Cdn should be nuclear free?		
become a nuclear free zone	55%	66%
not become a nuclear free zone	45%	34%
Refuse or allow cruise testing?		
refuse further cruise testing	63%	85%
allow further cruise testing	37%	15%
Cda should stregthen NATO		
strongly disagree	8%	17%
disagree	39%	38%
agree	33%	24%
strongly agree	20%	20%

(continued)

Table 3D Attitudes on Canadian Policy by Language

	LANG	
	English	French
Europe more responsible for defence		
strongly disagree	6%	9%
disagree	27%	29%
agree	41%	38%
strongly agree	25%	24%